

# HYDROPOWER PLANT DIGITALIZATION FORUM

8<sup>th</sup> - 9<sup>th</sup> June 2021



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Risk Assessment and Digitalization  
of Static Components at Hydro  
Plants: a Massive Application to  
Penstocks and Waterways


# STATIC COMPONENTS – THE UGLY DUCKLING OF HYDRO DIGITALIZATION

Definition: software and hardware to improve operation and maintenance of HPPs

1. What can we do when Big Data are not available?
2. Does anyone have a vague idea of what are the main causes of failure of a hydroelectric power plant?
3. Are failures due to problems with static components or problems with rotating ones prevailing?
4. Are there, or do we need, deterministic models to feed digital models of hydroelectric plants?
5. How far can we go with the digitalization of small fleets or single small hydroelectric plants?

# STATIC COMPONENTS – THE UGLY DUCKLING OF HYDRO DIGITALIZATION

**Hydroelectric plant:** a set of components functionally connected to transform the water resource into energy



# STATIC COMPONENTS – THE UGLY DUCKLING OF HYDRO DIGITALIZATION

## Old method



50% success




No control on rivets and penstock shell in 70 years



No need for complex systems: common sense is enough

## New method


$$\frac{\partial u_i^+}{\partial t^+} + u_j^+ \frac{\partial u_i^+}{\partial x_j^+} + Re^{-1} = -\frac{\partial p^+}{\partial x_i^+} + Re^{-1} \frac{\partial^2 u_i^+}{\partial x_j^+ \partial x_j^+}$$
$$\sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_j} u(x_i, x_j) = \sum_{i=1}^N \left( \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i} \right)^2 u^2(x_i) + 2 \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^N \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_i} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x_j} u(x_i, x_j)$$



50% failure

# THE METHOD

- Identifies the ways in which a product can fail (failure modes)
- Estimates the risk associated to a specific cause
- Prioritize the failure mode (and actions)



**Severity**

x

**Occurrence**

x

**Detection**

=

**RPN**

RPN VALUE	RISK LEVEL	ACTIONS
up to 12	Negligible	None
from 13 to 25	Low	To be considered on a case by case basis
from 26 to 50	Medium	Action aimed to reduce the risk
over 50	High	Urgent action aimed to reduce the risk



# REAL CASES

*October'19*

17 PLANTS, 17 STRUCTURES:

- 17 penstocks

*October'20*

25 PLANTS, 58 STRUCTURES:

- 35 penstocks,
- 15 tunnels,
- 8 channels.

*December'20*

30 PLANTS, 130 STRUCTURES:

- 58 penstocks,
- 52 tunnels,
- 21 channels.



# FAILURE MODES & CAUSES

## PENSTOCKS

Failure mode	Cause
<b>Pipe hole</b>	Stray current
<b>Partial failure</b>	Human error
	Damage or pull-out of joint
	Failure of connections
	Failure of constraints
	Wear of constraints
	Failure of pipe shell
	Wear of pipe shell
<b>Total failure</b>	Impacts and other environmental factors
	Attacks and vandalism

## CHANNELS

Failure mode	Cause
<b>Banks overflow</b>	Flood hazard
	Unsuitable freeboard
<b>Partial failure</b>	Seismology
	Structural failure of the work
	Human error
<b>Total failure</b>	Slopes instability
	Attacks and vandalism

## TUNNELS

Failure mode	Cause
<b>Partial failure</b>	Instability and/or decay of the rock mass structural conditions
	Presence of active/inactive tectonic lines and seismology
	Critical hydrogeological conditions
	Absence or damage of the lining
	Failure of the watertight doors in the manholes
	Presence of irrigation valves
	Human error
<b>Total failure</b>	Slopes instability
	Critical sections
	Attacks and vandalism

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS


General Overview

Penstocks

Tunnels

Channels

## Global risk levels of all the assessed works





# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS


General Overview

**Penstocks**


Tunnels

Channels

**Risk levels**



**Causes of highest RPN values**



Cause: Failure of pipe shell					
Range of Occurrence	No.	Range of Detection	No.	Range of Severity	No.
0-1	3	0-1	5	0-1	4
1-2	5	1-2	6	1-2	49
2-3	13	2-3	1	2-3	2
3-4	34	3-4	2	3-4	0
		4-5	41	4-5	0

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS


General Overview

Penstocks


**Tunnels**

Channels

**Risk levels**



**Causes of highest RPN values**



**Cause: Critical hydrogeological conditions**

Range of Occurrence	No.	Range of Detection	No.	Range of Severity	No.
0-1	0	0-1	0	0-1	2
1-2	2	1-2	14	1-2	40
2-3	3	2-3	28	2-3	0
3-4	37	3-4	0	3-4	0
		4-5	0	4-5	0

# STATISTICAL ANALYSIS


General Overview

Penstocks


Tunnels

**Channels**

**Risk levels**



**Causes of highest RPN values**



**Cause: Structural failure of the component**

Range of Occurrence	No.	Range of Detection	No.	Range of Severity	No.
0-1	0	0-1	1	0-1	10
1-2	1	1-2	0	1-2	19
2-3	0	2-3	6	2-3	0
3-4	28	3-4	0	3-4	0
		4-5	22	4-5	0

# CRITICAL REVIEW



Easy implementation even specific information lacking



Positive reduction of the time



Objective, consistent



DECISION-MAKING tool

# CONCLUSIONS

1. The ability of a hydroelectric plant to produce energy or supply power depends on the efficiency and reliability of all its components
2. Static components deserve the same attention than rotating ones
3. A preliminary analysis (e.g. FMEA) of the functional links between the different components of a HPP can help in prioritizing the (expensive) monitoring efforts of digitalization
4. Sharing data about plants failures in the hydro community could help the creation of statistically significant conclusions
5. Site-specificity of hydropower requires a great preliminary effort in adapting general methods to peculiar situations

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STRATEGIES FOR WATER  
**FROSIO**  
next 

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

Luigi Papetti